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Murray-Darling Basin water markets 2 
Alec Zuo  Feng Qiu  Sarah Ann Wheeler  3 




Although participation in water markets is widespread by irrigators in the Murray-8 
Darling Basin of Australia, there has been a lack of study on the dynamics of water 9 
markets, in particular price and volume dynamic responses, volatility and spillovers. 10 
Questions have also been raised regarding the impact on markets from governments 11 
buying back permanent water from consumptive use to return to environmental use. 12 
VARX-BEKK-GARCH time-series regression was used to model the water market 13 
dynamics of monthly permanent and temporary water market trade from 1997-2017 in 14 
one of the largest water markets in the Murray-Darling Basin, the Goulburn. Results 15 
suggest that volatility in the permanent water market was less than the temporary market, 16 
while persistency in volatility only exists in permanent markets. Unidirectional 17 
transmission spillovers exists in both markets from prices to volumes. The main drivers 18 
of temporary water prices were water scarcity related, while permanent prices were most 19 
significantly influenced by previous permanent water prices and current temporary water 20 
market prices. A statistically significant negative impact on temporary volume-traded 21 
from government water recovery (e.g. a 1% increase in water recovery resulted in a 22 
0.14% reduction in water volume-traded) was found, but no significant impact was found 23 
on temporary water prices, nor on permanent market prices and volumes. However, 24 
government water recovery increased the volatility of temporary market prices and 25 
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volumes, signaling increased issues of risk and uncertainty for irrigators engaging in 26 
temporary water markets.  27 
Keywords: water entitlement market; water allocation market; VARX-BEKK-GARCH 28 
models; buyback  29 
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1. Introduction 30 
Water markets are increasingly being used around the world as a way to reallocate water 31 
to more efficient use (Chong and Sunding 2006; Grafton and Horne 2014; Zekri and 32 
Easter 2007). In particular, water markets in Australia have developed to a high level of 33 
maturity, having been in existence for over thirty years in some areas (Wheeler et al. 34 
2014a). Irrigators can buy and sell water allocations (otherwise known as temporary 35 
seasonal water and are traded on an annual basis) or water entitlements (otherwise known 36 
permanent trade or water rights and are traded on a permanent basis), and recently there 37 
has been further maturation with the development of forward contracts in the water 38 
market. However, the use of water markets in Australia has not been without controversy, 39 
and there continues to be an ongoing debate over their social and economic impacts and 40 
the role that government intervention has played (e.g. Crase 2017). 41 
 42 
One of the main advantages of water markets is that it allows water to be traded to its 43 
highest possible use, it encourages efficiency and it helps support long-term farm 44 
development (Grafton et al. 2011; Grafton et al. 2016). Consumptive users can mitigate 45 
their supply risk by purchasing water when it is most needed or selling water if the price 46 
of water sale exceeds the use value derived from applying the water in irrigation. It has 47 
been widely acknowledged that if water markets had not been present during the 48 
Millennium drought of the 2000s in Australia, many more irrigators would have gone 49 
bankrupt (Kirby et al. 2014; Wheeler et al. 2014b). Water markets can also benefit urban 50 
users by allowing cities to purchase reliable supply for critical human needs during 51 
drought or to support urban expansion. Most existing literature on water markets 52 
examines price and volume traded, without further investigating their volatility dynamics 53 
(including both vulnerability and persistency) and potential volatility spillovers, although 54 
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these are often studied in financial, commodity and energy markets (e.g. Abdelradi and 55 
Serra 2015; An et al. 2016; Lee and Rui 2002). Given the mature stage of Australian 56 
water markets, it offers an ideal opportunity to study volatility dynamics and spillovers.  57 
 58 
Understanding water markets’ vulnerability and persistency helps illustrate market 59 
participants’ exposure to external shocks. For example, substantial vulnerability to 60 
market shocks can increase price uncertainty and risk for future irrigation investors and 61 
water users who are reliant on water markets for their water needs. Persistency in a water 62 
market refers to whether the current level of volatility is largely dependent upon past 63 
volatility. A high level of persistency suggests that external shocks will not dramatically 64 
affect volatility. However, because of high persistency, it takes much longer for a large 65 
change in price/volume to dissipate compared to the vulnerable but non-persistent case.  66 
 67 
The sophistication and development of water markets in the Murray-Darling Basin 68 
(MDB) have allowed them to be used as a market and compensation-based approach by 69 
federal government to acquire environmental water through the voluntary buyback of 70 
consumptive water and returned to the environment. When a water market is used for 71 
reallocation from consumptive users to the environment, ecological conditions can 72 
benefit when water is bought and used for environmental flows in rivers (Connor et al. 73 
2013). These buybacks have been largely implemented through voluntary reverse 74 
auctions with irrigators, and on-farm and off-farm irrigation infrastructure subsidies to 75 
recover water (Grafton and Wheeler 2018).  76 
 77 
Acceptance of buyback as a policy instrument has not been achieved easily in Australia 78 
and the perceived political costs continue to influence federal water policy (Crase 2017). 79 
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Given increasing political pressure from irrigator lobby groups who believe government 80 
buyback of water has caused significant harm to rural communities, in 2015 a 1,500 GL 81 
(gigalitre) cap on total permanent water entitlement buyback was established and in late 82 
2017 the Murray-Darling Basin Authority (MDBA) recommended that buyback be 83 
stopped and all future environmental water be recovered from on- and off-farm irrigation 84 
infrastructure. This is contrary to considerable evidence from economists that buyback is 85 
more cost-effective, has less negative environmental externalities, and that the cost of 86 
buyback on rural communities has been overestimated (Crase 2017; Grafton and Wheeler 87 
2018; Wittwer 2011). 88 
 89 
This study takes advantage of a unique time-series dataset on Australia’s largest regional 90 
water market (analyzing prices and volumes traded on a monthly basis since 1997 in 91 
northern Victoria) and seeks to: 1) characterize the vulnerability and persistency of price 92 
and volume traded dynamics in temporary and permanent water markets; 2) investigate 93 
the transmission of volatility between price and volume in the temporary and permanent 94 
water markets; and 3) examine the impact of returning water from consumptive to 95 
environmental use (buyback and irrigation infrastructure grants) on both water market 96 
prices, volumes and their volatility.  97 
 98 
The key findings include that the permanent market is generally less vulnerable than the 99 
temporary market; and that persistency in volatility only exists in the permanent market. 100 
Unidirectional transmission was found in both markets, with spillovers from prices to 101 
volumes only. Although the results suggested a small inelastic response of temporary 102 
water volume to government water recovery (a 1% increase in water recovery volume 103 
was associated with a 0.14% decrease in the temporary volume traded in the market), the 104 
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decrease in volume did not translate to a significant impact on temporary prices. Water 105 
scarcity factors were the main influence on temporary prices. However, government 106 
water recovery did result in a significant small positive impact on the volatility of price 107 
and volumes in temporary markets which may need further investigation. Given that 108 
water markets are increasingly proposed as a solution for world-wide water scarcity 109 
issues (Wheeler et al. 2017), insights gained from analyzing one of the world’s most 110 
sophisticated and developed water markets provide additional information to the debate. 111 
 112 
2. Case Study Area: MDB and Water Markets Background 113 
The MDB is known as Australia’s food bowl, and includes regions within Queensland, 114 
New South Wales (NSW), Victoria (VIC), South Australia (SA), and all of the Australian 115 
Capital Territory. Irrigators within the MDB use more than half of the irrigation water 116 
applied nationally. For example, in 2016/17, water application by irrigators in the MDB 117 
accounted for 67% of all water applied by Australian farms (ABS, 2018). In particular, 118 
water markets have developed significantly in the southern MDB. Water rights (or 119 
licences) are defined as the right to access a share or ‘entitlement’ of water from a 120 
consumptive pool (Wheelers et al. 2014a), which can be traded within a number of areas 121 
in Australia. Entitlements vary in regards to their reliability and area (entitlement security 122 
falls into three main categories: high security (HS); general security (GS) and low 123 
security (LS)1). Each type of entitlement yields a seasonal volumetric allocation which is 124 
the amount that can be extracted by its’ owner within the season and put to beneficial use 125 
(or traded temporarily).  126 
 127 
                                                 
1HS is available in NSW, Victoria, and SA, GS is mainly in NSW and LS is mainly in Victoria. On 
average, LS owners are only expected to receive 100% of their water entitlements in 24–35 out of 100 
years, GS full entitlements in 64–81 years, and HS 90–95 years (Zuo et al. 2015). 
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Water markets in the MDB were first established formally within irrigation districts from 128 
the 1980s onwards and, over time, trade has been permitted in terms of actual water 129 
entitlements and then across districts (MDBA 2010). The 1990s saw continual 130 
fundamental water reforms, upon which all current major water policy and institutions 131 
evolved, including the unbundling of land and water entitlements (Grafton and Horne 132 
2014; Young 2014). One of the reasons given for the success and adoption of water 133 
markets is because of the considerable institutional, governance and property right 134 
development that has gone into establishing conditions for water markets. Registers, 135 
accounting systems, hydrology basin research, monitoring and management of 136 
externalities have continually been developed, updated and refined over time, especially 137 
in the southern MDB that has the largest share of water markets in Australia (Young 138 
2014; Wheeler et al. 2017). Institutional arrangements are necessary to enable efficient 139 
(water to be moved to its highest use with minimal transaction costs) and equitable (in 140 
the sense that water use is monitored and complied with by various stakeholders) water 141 
trading (Grafton et al. 2016). Most water trade occurs between irrigators, many of whom 142 
use water markets as a risk management strategy (Nauges et al. 2016), although the 143 
Commonwealth has become an increasingly significant player with their growing 144 
ownership of environmental entitlements (Grafton 2019).  145 
 146 
In the early 2000s, Australian governments started using markets as a way to securing 147 
water for the environment. These reforms started partly because of the establishment of 148 
the National Water Initiative (NWI) in 2004. The NWI was an intergovernmental 149 
agreement across states to address over-allocation and achieve environmental objectives 150 
in the MDB (COAG 2004). The NWI paved the way for on-going federal water reforms 151 
such as the Water Act (2007) which sought to establish robust institutions to support the 152 
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function and regulation of water markets. In 2012 the MDB Plan was passed into law, 153 
and it set sustainable diversion limits for consumptive use, which will come into full 154 
effect in 2019. A total reallocation target of 2,750GL2 (e.g. this represented around a 155 
quarter reduction in consumptive water use across the Basin) was to be reallocated to the 156 
environment by 2019, with an extra 450GL recovered through infrastructure investment 157 
expenditure (Grafton, 2019). The Water for the Future program in 2008 sought to 158 
recover water through irrigation on- and off-farm infrastructure subsidies (AUD$5.8 159 
billion for the Sustainable Rural Water Use Infrastructure Program (SRWUIP)), 160 
followed by permanent water purchases (AUD$3.1 billion for a program called Restoring 161 
the Balance (RTB)) (Grafton and Wheeler 2018). Most of the water recovered via 162 
buyback has been through using a reverse auction mechanism, although there have also 163 
been a number of strategic purchases of large land and water holdings, especially since 164 
2014-15 (DAWR 2019). 165 
 166 
However, despite their wide adoption, water markets in the MDB have not been without 167 
controversy (e.g. Crase 2017). It is important to note that there are two aspects of this 168 
controversy: a) general privatisation and commodification arguments; and b) water 169 
recovery impacts on rural communities from using water markets as the instrument for 170 
recovery. Grafton et al. (2016) evaluates the privatisation and commodification 171 
arguments, and suggests that any evidence for any negative impact of these claims is 172 
scarce (albeit appropriate meta-governance and institutional rules and property rights are 173 
essential for well-functioning water markets).  In relation to the second point about the 174 
impacts of water recovery on rural communities, there has been continual pressure since 175 
                                                 
2In mid-2018 this total figure was reduced by 605GL, due to the MDBA’s adjustment mechanism and 
assessment of the package of supply measures nominated by State Governments could offset water 
recovery through various water and environmental efficiency projects (Grafton 2019). 
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the Basin plan passed to try to reduce water recovery. There have been arguments made 176 
regarding the impact of buyback on rural communities in terms of: a) reductions in farm 177 
production from decreased water use and flow-on impacts on rural jobs; and b) impact on 178 
water markets through increased permanent and temporary prices (e.g. see RMCG 2016). 179 
These claims have resulted in the current halt on recovering any water via buyback, with 180 
all remaining recovery now through on and off-farm irrigation infrastructure, and an 181 
adjustment downwards of physical volumes of water recovery (Grafton 2019). 182 
Economists have pointed out that this ignores the following issues: 1) as at the beginning 183 
of 2018, water recovery through irrigation infrastructure cost at least 2.5 times more per 184 
mega-litre than buyback (and this relative difference is increasing); 2) subsidizing 185 
irrigation infrastructure reduces return flows into groundwater and surface-water; and 3) 186 
subsidizing irrigation infrastructure causes a rebound effect (changing crop mix to often 187 
permanent crops and increasing irrigation area). In turn, this increases overall farm water 188 
use, reduces diversification across the Basin and places farms at further risk in a future 189 
drought (Adamson and Loch 2018; Grafton 2019; Grafton and Wheeler 2018; Perry et al. 190 
2017). 191 
 192 
In seeking to understand the dynamics and impacts of water markets, it is first worth 193 
working through some theoretical insights about demand and supply in water markets. 194 
Water entitlements recovered by the government through buyback and irrigation 195 
infrastructure grants reduce the amount of water entitlements owned in an area. Although 196 
the law of demand and supply suggests we would expect that if the supply of water goes 197 
down in an area, then prices in a water market should increase over time, however, there 198 




First, there is a difference between: a) water entitlements long-term average annual yield 201 
(LTAAY) owned by stakeholders in a region at particular points in time (highest ML); b) 202 
water allocations received annually by the region for their entitlements they own (from the 203 
2000s onwards this was lower than ownership and fluctuates widely); and c) water 204 
allocations/diversions used in a region by stakeholders (usually lower than b – but 205 
dependent upon issues with carry-over and water trade movements – and also fluctuates 206 
widely as shown in Figure 1)). Correspondingly, total volume of water supplied in 207 
temporary water markets in a region is dependent upon: i) water allocations; ii) total 208 
portfolio of permanent water in the region and iii) sellers’ willingness/ability to sell water. 209 
As previously highlighted, entitlements receive annual water allocations and, depending 210 
on drought and rainfall, an allocation within a water season can range from 0% to 100%. 211 
Hence, annual water diversions fluctuate considerably year by year (Figure 1). In addition, 212 
demand for water in the market is also not linear, due to adaptation, carryover, substitution 213 
and underutilization. Wheeler et al. (2014b) found that historically irrigators in the MDB 214 
have only used around 70% of their water allocations they receive. Therefore, even if water 215 
diversions are reduced, irrigators may not increase their demand for temporary water in the 216 
market (because they increase their utilization of water entitlements or adapt to less water 217 
correspondingly). Previous research has shown that seasonal factors such as water 218 
allocations, drought and low water storages are the critical factors driving temporary water 219 
prices (e.g. Wheeler et al. 2008). Given that total portfolio of permanent water ownership 220 
in an area only changes slowly over time (given government buyback but also private 221 
irrigator permanent trade volumes), Figure One illustrates the growing Federal ownership 222 
of entitlements in the Goulburn, while water allocations and diversions fluctuate widely, it 223 
is therefore an empirical question over what influences supply in the temporary water 224 
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market the most (e.g. seasonal fluctuations or increased activity by government in buying 225 
water back and taking out a volume of supply).  226 
FIGURE 1 227 
In terms of understanding influences on permanent water markets, it is important to note 228 
that total water market trade volumes are dominated by temporary trade (see trade volumes 229 
in Figure 2), while a relatively smaller amount of permanent trade is conducted in the 230 
MDB. Research has shown that permanent water trading is more related to long-term 231 
considerations such as farm and environmental/spatial characteristics, and that 232 
participation in permanent trade has increased gradually over time, especially from 2006 233 
onwards (e.g. Wheeler et al., 2010; Zuo et al. 2015; Grafton and Wheeler 2018). Hence, 234 
given that current water supply in permanent water markets is very small compared to total 235 
water ownership, and that participation in permanent markets has increased over our time-236 
period from 2006 onwards, it is again an empirical question as to what impact overall 237 
increasing water recovery plays in permanent water market dynamics where demand is 238 
inelastic (e.g. Zuo et al. 2015). The exact impact may also depend on the extent to which 239 
the permanent or temporary market plays a price leadership role, and understanding the 240 
dynamics of the interactions between permanent and temporary markets will help answer 241 
this question. 242 
 243 
As such, this suggests it may be hard to theoretically predict the impact of government 244 
interventions on the local water markets, both permanent and temporary. Although we have 245 
some expectations that water supply ownership by irrigators overall will change, impacts 246 
on water market prices and dynamics will depend critically on how much demand and 247 
supply in the markets are affected, not on how much water ownership is changed because 248 
the studied market can be a fraction of total water ownership. Furthermore, the links and 249 
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substitution between both permanent and temporary surface-water and groundwater 250 
utilization and markets, farmer adaptation to less water availability, and other key seasonal 251 
water market factors will all influence water market outcomes. It is also worth noting that 252 
higher prices in water markets (whether it is due to scarcity factors or government 253 
involvement) do not necessarily decrease net social welfare, given that water sellers receive 254 
higher prices, while water buyers are paying higher prices. Higher water prices also spur 255 
increased innovation and adaptation by irrigators. This is also illustrated by the evaluation 256 
of the net social welfare change in Australia from the implementation of water recovery in 257 
the MDB, which has shown that the societal benefits outweigh the costs overall (Grafton, 258 
2019). 259 
 260 
Within the existing literature, Young and McColl (2008) first suggested that government 261 
buyback policy would influence the water market by increasing permanent prices. ABARE 262 
(2010) estimated that buyback would result in an increase of 17.5% in permanent water 263 
market prices in the southern MDB. Aither (2016) suggested that about a quarter of the 264 
increase in temporary water prices was attributable to buyback, with climatic factors being 265 
the main driver of variability. RMCG (2016 p. 41) studied the impact of buyback on the 266 
Goulburn (the same area studied here), and claimed that the buyback program led to a 267 
doubling of temporary water prices, as well as significantly increasing long-term 268 
permanent prices. However, these existing studies do not always carefully consider the 269 
difference between water market supply and water entitlement ownership, and are 270 
significantly constrained by methodology, data availability and assumptions used, as well 271 
as only focused on the impact on levels of price and volume without considering volatility 272 
impacts. There is therefore a need to properly model and consider all the dynamic 273 
adjustment processes and spillover magnitudes within water markets, and to evaluate the 274 
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potential impact of government water recovery in markets, including both levels and 275 
volatilities of price and volume.  276 
 277 
3. Literature review on market dynamics  278 
A large number of studies on market dynamics in financial markets focus on the 279 
theoretical and empirical relationship between price (or price returns) and trading volume 280 
(Gallant et al. 1992; Gündüz and Hatemi-J 2005; Karpoff 1987).  Price-volume 281 
relationships provide insights into market structure, such as how information flows to the 282 
market; dissemination of information and how much market prices convey this 283 
information. The sequential information arrival model (e.g. Copeland 1976; Jennings et 284 
al. 1981) suggests a positive causal relationship between stock prices and trading volume 285 
in either direction. The mixture distributions model (Epps and Epps 1976) proposed that 286 
trading volume can be used to measure disagreement as traders revise their reservation 287 
prices based on new information arrival into the market, suggesting a positive causal 288 
relationship from trading volume to absolute stock returns. In the model by Blume, 289 
Easley, and O’Hara (1994), volume traded provides data on the quality or precision of 290 
information on past price patterns, while Wang (1994) shows that volume may provide 291 
information about expected future returns based on a model with information asymmetry. 292 
 293 
Early empirical studies on the price-volume linkage mainly focused on their 294 
contemporaneous relationship but rarely investigated the causal relationships (Crouch 295 
1970; Granger and Morgenstern 1963; Karpoff 1987). On the dynamic and causal links 296 
between stock prices and volume, Hiemstra and Jones (1994) found uni-directional 297 
Granger causality from stock returns to trading volume, while Gallant, Rossi, and 298 
Tauchen (1992) found a strong impact from lagged stock returns to current and future 299 
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trading volume but a weak impact from lagged volume to current and future stock 300 
returns. Using bivariate and multivariate vector autoregression (VAR), Lee and Rui 301 
(2002) found that volume does not Granger-cause stock market returns and a positive 302 
feedback relationship between volume and return volatility existed.  303 
 304 
Besides the relationship between price and volume within one market, price transmission 305 
across multiple markets has become increasingly the topic for market dynamics studies 306 
(An et al. 2016; Esposti and Listorti 2013; Serra and Goodwin 2003).  Price transmission 307 
can occur both vertically and horizontally. Vertical price transmission refers to linkages 308 
along the supply chain (Serra and Goodwin 2003 and An et al. 2016 provide agricultural 309 
examples) while horizontal price transmission means linkages among different markets at 310 
the same position in the supply chain (Esposti and Listorti 2013).  311 
 312 
Price transmission models study either price behavior in levels or on volatility patterns 313 
(Assefa et al. 2015). Nonstructural time-series models are usually employed, which has 314 
the advantage of only requiring price data for econometric estimation (Serra and Gil 315 
2013). For example, An et al. (2016) use a co-integration test to identify whether export 316 
restrictions dampened the price transmission from the wheat to the flour market in 317 
Ukraine and an asymmetric VEC-BEKK-GARCH model investigated price spillovers 318 
between the two markets.  319 
 320 
In the existing water market literature, studies on the relationship between price and 321 
volume have focused mainly on estimating the price elasticity of demand or supply 322 
(Brooks and Harris 2005; Wheeler et al. 2008; Zuo et al. 2015). Wheeler et al. (2008) 323 
analyzed the influences on water temporary and permanent prices in the GMID from 324 
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1993-2007 and found that the temporary price was most influenced by short-term water 325 
scarcity factors (e.g. drought and water allocations). Although there has been some work 326 
in the literature about whether water markets exhibit characteristics similar to other 327 
financial markets (e.g. market depth in Brooks, Harris, and Joymungul 2009; price 328 
clustering features in Brooks, Harris, and Joymungul 2013 and Zuo et al. 2014; and price 329 
leadership in Brooks and Harris 2014), there are many other financial characteristics 330 
aspects of water markets that have not been examined. These include a dynamic 331 
adjustments process of price and trading volume, volatility of price and trading volume, 332 
and spillovers between price and volume volatility. Through studying these dynamic 333 
adjustment processes with a unique monthly time-series from 1997 onwards, the 334 
vulnerability and persistency of price and volume in water markets can be characterized. 335 
 336 
4. Methodology 337 
4.1 Data and study area 338 
A unique historical monthly dataset of temporary and high security (HS) permanent 339 
water trade (namely prices and volumes traded) between 1997 and 2017 from the 340 
Goulburn trading zone of GMID, northern Victoria is used (total n=227). The majority of 341 
irrigated crops in the area in this time-period are annual (pastures and cereals), followed 342 
by permanent horticulture. The Goulburn-Murray Irrigation District (GMID) historically 343 
is Australia’s largest irrigation district and it has the largest and most active water-trading 344 
zone, the Goulburn (i.e. trading zone 1A Greater Goulburn), in terms of trading volume 345 
and number of trades (Wheeler et al. 2008; 2009; 2010).  For example, in 2017-18, trade 346 
within the Goulburn represented 39% of total trades (by number) in the southern MDB.3 347 
                                                 




Brooks and Harris (2014) have also shown evidence that the Goulburn is a price leader 348 
across trading zones. As at June 2018, 355.7 GLs (LTAAY) of water were returned from 349 
consumptive to environmental use in the Goulburn (DAWR 2019), with the majority of 350 
this coming from buyback programs (see Grafton and Wheeler 2018 for more detailed 351 
analysis of recovery volumes and costs over time).  352 
 353 
The monthly water trade data was supplemented by other monthly data sources of known 354 
drivers of water markets (e.g. dairy commodity output and input prices, temperature and 355 
seasonal water allocations), previously identified from the literature (e.g. Brooks and 356 
Harris 2010; Wheeler et al. 2008; Zuo et al. 2014). In addition, a government water 357 
recovery variable was included in the modeling, measured as the accumulative volume of 358 
permanent water (LTAAY) recovered for the environment through the Commonwealth 359 
government buyback and irrigation infrastructure programs. In addition, alternative 360 
specifications of water recovery were also tested.4  361 
 362 
Table 1 provides the detailed definitions for the dependent and independent variables 363 
used in the analysis. Price (Bjornlund and Rossini 2005; Wheeler et al. 2008) and volume 364 
(Wheeler et al. 2008) determinants of water markets in the MDB have been well 365 
documented in the literature, particularly for the GMID, for example: water scarcity 366 
(temperature, water allocations); irrigation agriculture output prices (milk prices as dairy 367 
is the biggest irrigation industry in the GMID); and irrigation commodity input prices 368 
                                                 
4Table A in the Appendix presents similar results with buyback program volumes only. In addition, other 
testing using a dummy variable to represent the months in which the government was actively buying water 
entitlements in the market was conducted. However, due to the use of first differences, the dummy variable 
converted to one in the months when the government started a new tender for buyback, minus one in the 
months immediately after the tender was closed and zero for all the other months. In total, the non-zero 
months only represent around 8.8% of the total sample, which is a considerably small proportion and 
created an identification difficulty in estimating the impact of government buyback dummy on the market. 
Therefore, the dummy variable specification was not used. 
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(feed barley for feeding cows as a substitute for watering pasture). In time-series 369 
econometrics, parsimonious models can produce more accurate forecasts, given that the 370 
information set is extended to include past movements of multiple variables (Verbeek 371 
2012). Therefore, we only include the most relevant independent variables and the 372 
government water recovery variable in the models.  373 
TABLE 1 374 
Figure 2 provides an overview of the movements in water market prices and volumes 375 
traded in the Goulburn trading zone. Both HS permanent prices and temporary water 376 
prices fluctuate greatly. The temporary water market volume has increased substantially 377 
while the permanent volume is much smaller, but has increased over time.  378 
FIGURE 2  379 
 380 
4.2 Empirical Strategy 381 
Before deciding on the appropriate empirical strategy, we performed the Augmented 382 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron (PP) unit root tests and the results (Table 2) 383 
indicated that permanent volume was stationary and the two price series were non-384 
stationary. Meanwhile, ADF and PP tests indicated contradictory results for the 385 
temporary volume series: ADF suggested non-stationarity while PP suggested 386 
stationarity. After transforming the series into first-differenced form, the unit root null 387 
was rejected, implying the differenced series were I(0).  388 
 389 
To investigate the price-volume interactions as well as volatility spillovers, a multivariate 390 
GARCH model, known as the VARX- BEKK-GARCH model was applied (An et al. 391 
2016). VARX refers to a VAR model with exogenous variables. The BEKK-GARCH 392 
framework developed by Engle and Kroner (1995) has two attractive empirical 393 
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properties. First, the model was constructed to ensure positive-definiteness on the 394 
conditional variance-covariance matrix of the regression model residuals. Second, the 395 
model parameters can directly measure volatility spillovers including the size and 396 
direction, which is especially relevant to this study. We used the bivariate BEKK-397 
GARCH instead of a four-variable BEKK-GARCH because of the dimensionality 398 
problem associated with the BEKK model (Anthony and Stavropoulos 2012; Zhen et al. 399 
2018).  Estimation of a multivariate BEKK-GARCH model involves substantial 400 
computations due to the high-dimensional nonlinear optimization nature. The number of 401 
parameters is relatively large, especially if we estimate the BEKK variance/covariance 402 
equations together with the VARX mean equations as a system to improve efficiency.5  403 
Because bivariate VARX models can only apply to stationary time-series data unless 404 
there is a cointegrating relationship between the two I(1) series, we therefore used the 405 
first-differenced logarithm data to investigate volume-price dynamics. For the price 406 
transmission model, cointegration was first tested using the Johansen trace test (Johansen 407 
1991). Given the rejection of cointegration, a VARX-BEKK-GARCH model based on 408 
differenced data was adopted.     409 
 410 
4.2.1 Volume-price interactions in the permanent and temporary markets 411 
Since preliminary analysis suggested no co-integration between price and volume in both 412 
markets, we investigated dynamic adjustments, policy impacts and volatility spillovers by 413 
estimating two VARX- BEKK-GARCH models, namely permanent price—volume, and 414 
temporary price—volume. To fit any multivariate GARCH model, an appropriate 415 
                                                 
5In our four-variable case, estimating a VAR(2)-BEKK-GARCH(1,1) model involves estimating 122 
parameters simultaneously. Obtaining convergence therefore is difficult because the variance/covariance 
parameters are nonlinear in nature. We tried the multivariate BEKK-GARCH with different VAR lags, and 
most models did not converge. In the literature, it is rare to see a BEKK model with more than three 
variables due primarily to this curse of dimensionality issue. Common practices are bivariate BEKK-
GARCH (e.g. Anthony and Stavropoulos 2012) or 3-variable BEKK-GARCH (e.g. Serra et al. 2011). 
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conditional mean model is required. For the two pair-wise volume-price adjustment 416 
processes, the conditional mean model was specified as a bivariate VARX model to 417 
quantify policy effects and other influences. The mean model in a VARX-BEKK-418 
GARCH framework was expressed as: 419 
1 1
1| ~ (0, )
t t
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j t i j t j
i j
t t t
ty y z Govn
H





        

 
   (1) 420 
  




log   log  
volume price
ty
    
       
    
 422 
was a 2 1  vector of the volume and price changes (i.e., the first difference of logarithm), 423 
  a 2 1 vector of constants,  and ,  , 1,...,i j i j n     are 1 2  parameter vectors 424 
associated with lagged dependent variables and additional exogenous variables such as 425 
agricultural commodity/input prices and seasonal water allocations. In this study, we are 426 
especially interested in estimating   which represents the impact from government water 427 
recovery. The last term t  is a 2 1  vector of residuals that depends on past information 428 
1t . This vector of residuals has zero mean and a conditional variance-covariance 429 
matrix tH : 430 
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For equation (2), the first component (C matrix) was an upper triangular parameter 436 
matrix. The second component was the autoregressive conditional heteroskedastic 437 
component and A is a matrix of ARCH parameters. The term 
'
1 1t t    was the outer 438 
product of residuals from the conditional mean equation (1). The third component allows 439 
for a moving average mechanism to the conditional variance, B a GARCH parameter 440 
matrix and D the parameter matrix reflects the impacts of buyback program on price and 441 
volume volatility as well as on the covariance between the two. The term tGovn  reflects 442 
the contemporaneous government water recovery.6 Matrix 1tH   is the conditional 443 
variance-covariance matrix from the previous period. Specifically, the hiis are conditional 444 
variances for each series i and hijs are the conditional covariances between series i and j. 445 
 446 
Lag structures for the conditional mean model were selected using the Bayesian 447 
information criterion. The conditional mean model was estimated simultaneously 448 
together with the conditional variance-covariance component using quasi-maximum 449 
likelihood methods (i.e., Equations 1 and 2 were estimated as a system) to improve 450 
efficiency.  451 
 452 
5. Results  453 
5.1 Volume-price interactions in the permanent market 454 
                                                 
6Correlations between lagged trade volumes/prices and government water recovery were tested and found 
negligible to cause potential coefficient identification issues for the government water recovery variable. 
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Table 3 presents the results of the estimated parameters from the bivariate VARX-455 
BEKK-GARCH model for the permanent water market. 456 
TABLE 3  457 
The conditional mean estimations from the first two panels in Table 3 indicate that for 458 
the permanent water market in the Goulburn, volume adjustment responds positively to 459 
lagged price adjustment, whereas lagged volume adjustment has no significant impact on 460 
price adjustment. A 1% increase in the previous month’s water price will result in a 461 
0.66% increase in the volume in current month, which may reflect that the supply of 462 
permanent water responds to better market opportunities, i.e. higher prices previously. 463 
With regard to government water recovery, the results did not suggest a statistically 464 
significant impact from buyback on the volume and price traded in the permanent market.  465 
 466 
The percentage of seasonal allocations received had a negative statistically significant 467 
impact on the permanent water volume traded (a 1% increase in seasonal temporary 468 
allocations causes a 0.42% reduction in the total volume traded). Meanwhile, seasonal 469 
allocations had no significant effect on traded permanent prices. However, temporary 470 
water market prices had a statistically significant positive impact on both price 471 
adjustment and volume traded in the permanent market. A 1% increase in temporary 472 
water prices resulted in a 0.33% increase in the permanent volume traded and a 0.03% 473 
increase in the permanent price.  474 
 475 
The conditional variance/covariance estimates are reported in the third panel in Table 3. 476 
The diagonal elements of matrix A capture own-volatilities resulting from lagged 477 
innovations (i.e., market shocks) while the diagonal elements of matrix B indicate how 478 
persistent the volatilities are. For the volume series, the relative size of A (1,1) is 479 
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compared to that of B (1,1): the permanent water volume traded is not vulnerable to new 480 
and unexpected market and/or policy changes (as shown in A(1,1)) while the estimated 481 
B(1,1)) was larger than A(1,1) and statistically significant which indicated that volatility 482 
in volume adjustment was persistent. Permanent volume trade takes a long time to reduce 483 
following a large rise or fall, for example due to policy intervention or adverse weather 484 
event. For the price series, A(2,2) and B(2,2) are about the same in their magnitudes. 485 
Therefore, this suggests that permanent prices are moderately vulnerable to new shocks 486 
such as new policy announcements and extreme weather events like droughts other than 487 
the factors that have been explicitly controlled in the model (i.e., the lagged volatility and 488 
the water recovery program). Meanwhile, volatility in price adjustment was moderately 489 
persistent and therefore reduces relatively faster than a highly persistent series.  490 
  491 
The off-diagonal elements of A(i,j) and B(i,j) measure spillovers from variable i 492 
(permanent volume if i=1, and permanent price if i=2) to variable j (permanent volume if 493 
j=1, and permanent price if j=2). The large and significant A(2,1) estimate indicates 494 
strong spillovers from permanent price adjustment to volume adjustment. Past volatilities 495 
in price adjustment continuously contributed to the current and future volatility in the 496 
volume adjustment. On the other hand, the insignificant A(1,2) and B(1,2) estimates 497 
indicate no spillovers from the volume traded to price.  498 
 499 
In summary, we find evidence of unidirectional volatility transmission from price to 500 
volume for the permanent market. In terms of the impact of government water recovery 501 
on the volume and price volatility, the matrix multiplication of the last term in Equation 2 502 
(i.e., tD D Govn  ) indicates that 
2
11d  represents the magnitudes of the water recovery 503 
program on the volatility of volumes and (
2 2
12 22d d ) captures the effects of the program 504 
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on price volatility. The statistically insignificant estimates of 
2 2 2
11 12 2 and sd d d  505 
suggests that the government recovery program does not contribute to the uncertainty 506 
(volatility) of the permanent water market.  507 
 508 
Figure 3 illustrates the results of estimated conditional volatilities. The volatility plots are 509 
consistent with the persistency and vulnerability results discussed previously. Volume 510 
volatility was more persistent than price volatility. Jumps of price volatility indicate 511 
moderate vulnerability to market shocks. Hence, several important implications can be 512 
gained from Figure 3. First, the magnitude of volume volatility was much larger than 513 
price volatility. Second, the pattern of volatility clustering is close, and the two 514 
volatilities tend to move/spike together. This also confirms the results of the volatility 515 
spillovers discussed previously. Finally, the strength of volatility, especially for 516 
permanent market volumes, has decreased in recent years. Large spikes as occurred in 517 
early years are now rare, indicating the increased adoption of permanent trade in our 518 
time-period.  519 
FIGURE 3 520 
5.2 Volume-price interactions in the temporary market 521 
Table 4 presents the results of the estimated parameters from the bivariate VARX-522 
BEKK-GARCH model for the temporary water market.7 The conditional mean 523 
estimations indicate that for the temporary market – which was a different result 524 
compared to the permanent market - volume adjustment responds negatively to lagged 525 
price adjustment. A 1% increase in lagged (by two months) temporary water prices 526 
                                                 
7The results (Table B, Appendix A) of using buyback volume alone remained the same except that the 
government water recovery coefficient in the volume equation became insignificant (p-value=0.118), 
which is largely consistent with Table 4’s measure of government water recovery (namely buyback and 
infrastructure water recovery) where a weak (p-value=0.098) statistically significant coefficient was found. 
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causes a statistically significant 0.44% decrease in the volume of temporary water traded. 527 
This probably reflects reduced water availability in general, or it may indicate that 528 
temporary water sellers are able to respond quickly to improved prices and sell in the 529 
current month, which consequently reduces the available temporary water for sale in the 530 
following months. Given that participation in temporary water markets by irrigators is 531 
considerably higher than permanent markets (Grafton and Wheeler 2018), this supports 532 
the above finding.   533 
 534 
Similar to the permanent market, lagged temporary volume adjustment has no significant 535 
impact on temporary price adjustment. Meanwhile, permanent prices have a significant 536 
positive impact on temporary prices and volumes. A 1% increase in the permanent price 537 
results in a 0.85% increase in the temporary volume-traded and a 0.33% increase in 538 
temporary prices. Combined with the results from the permanent market, this suggests 539 
that price adjustment in the temporary and permanent markets are dependent on each 540 
other and adjustments in one market will also affect the other.  541 
 542 
As expected, seasonal allocations received by irrigators had a highly positive significant 543 
impact on the temporary volume traded and a negative impact on temporary prices. A 1% 544 
increase in seasonal water allocations results in a 1.12% rise in the total temporary 545 
volume traded and a 0.24% reduction in temporary prices. Government water recovery 546 
did not have a statistically significant impact on temporary price adjustment but did have 547 
a significant influence on the temporary volume traded. A 1% increase in the government 548 
water recovery volume in the Goulburn resulted in a 0.136% decrease in the temporary 549 




The results further show that feed barley price (namely a substitution for watering 552 
pasture) had a significantly positive effect on the temporary water price (a 1% increase in 553 
the barley price raises temporary water prices by 0.63%). Temperature had a significant 554 
positive influence on the volume of temporary water traded. Specifically, a one-Celsius 555 
degree increase in mean monthly temperature raises temporary volume traded by 6.5%, 556 
with no significant impact on temporary water prices. 557 
 558 
The conditional variance/covariance estimates in the temporary market are reported in 559 
the third panel in Table 4. For the volume series, A(1,1) is much larger than B(1,1), 560 
suggesting that temporary volume traded was highly vulnerable to shocks, but volatility 561 
adjustment was not persistent. For the price series, although neither A(2,2) nor B(2,2) was 562 
statistically significant, the estimate of A(2,2) was almost 10 times of that of B(2,2), 563 
which suggests that in terms of vulnerability versus persistency, price volatility in the 564 
temporary market was much more vulnerable but such volatility adjustment was not 565 
persistent. Consistent with the permanent-market results, the volatility spillovers in the 566 
temporary markets are also uni-directional and go from price to volume (A(2,1)). 567 
Regarding the government water recovery effects, our results indicate that 10% increase 568 
in water recovered by the government can results in a 0.3% (=0.178^2*10) increase in 569 
the volume volatility and a very small increase of around 0.02% (=(0.03^2+0.049^2)*10) 570 
in price volatility of temporary trade.  571 
 572 
Figure 4 plots the estimated temporary water market conditional volatilities. The 573 
volatility plots are abrupt and show little persistency. Temporary volume volatility 574 
overall was much higher than price volatility; however, the difference between the two 575 
volatilities was smaller than the permanent water trade results in Figure 3. Second, the 576 
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two volatilities exhibit high co-movement/dependence, and the patterns are almost 577 
identical.8 This also provides evidence to support the results regarding volatility 578 
spillovers between the two series.  579 
FIGURE 4  580 
6. Discussion 581 
 582 
The findings suggest that in the temporary market, both price and volume are highly 583 
vulnerable, while price in the permanent market is moderately vulnerable but volume is 584 
not. Substantial vulnerability in the temporary market increases price uncertainty and 585 
makes it more difficult to plan production decisions if irrigators rely heavily on the 586 
temporary market. Although being vulnerable, volatility in price and volume in the 587 
temporary market is not persistent, suggesting buyers may avoid big losses if they can be 588 
more flexible in their water requirements (i.e. wait till the abrupt jump in price to 589 
dissipate soon; target different months of buying), and likewise sellers may benefit from 590 
selling before a volatile price jump disappears.  591 
 592 
On the other hand, permanent water market participants can expect this market to be less 593 
volatile. Compared to temporary markets, it is easier to predict future uncertainty in the 594 
permanent market based on the current and historical levels of uncertainty. However, 595 
because risks/external shocks are persistent if they indeed have an effect on volatility, in 596 
this case, it takes longer for such changes in prices/volumes to reduce in permanent 597 
markets compared to temporary markets.  598 
                                                 
8One exception is around mid-2008, there was a large drop in price volatility while an increase in volume 
volatility. This is likely due to large market shocks (the residuals) during this period. The shock contributed 
positively to volume volatility, but negatively to price volatility (Zhen et al. 2018). Therefore, a large price 
increase as well as an increased temporary trade volume from the previous month in mid-2008 caused the 




Cross-series volatility spillovers were found in both temporary and permanent water 600 
markets, in a unidirectional form (from price to volume). This finding suggest that if an 601 
external influence initially affects price volatility, it will spill-over to volume; but if an 602 
external influence first affects volume volatility, it will not be transmitted to price.  603 
 604 
In terms of government policy shocks, after controlling for factors commonly found to 605 
influence water prices, such as seasonal water allocations, temperature, and 606 
commodity/input prices, contrary to expectations, government water recovery had no 607 
significant impact on either permanent or temporary prices. But, water recovery did had a 608 
small positive impact on the volatility of monthly temporary prices and volumes. 9 609 
Volatility symbolizes the market's risk and uncertainty, and, like expected returns, can 610 
have a crucial effect on traders.  611 
 612 
Our results also highlight that previous estimates (e.g. Aither 2016; RMCG 2016) about 613 
the impacts of government water recovery on water markets are overestimated. Our 614 
findings support other economic studies that have shown that the buyback of water 615 
entitlements on rural communities has had far less impact than has been commonly 616 
claimed. Reasons for this include the difference between water entitlement ownership 617 
and supply of water on the market as previously discussed, but also include demand 618 
factors such as farmer adaptation, surplus water use, surface-ground water substitution 619 
and farm restructuring following the sale of permanent water by irrigators (e.g., Connor 620 
et al. 2014; Kirby et al. 2014; Quiggin et al. 2010; Wheeler and Cheesman 2013; Wheeler 621 
                                                 
9It should be noted that although increased volatility is an extra cost for irrigators, it does not suggest that 
environmental water recovery is inefficient. Losses associated with one group of market participants does 
not mean net social welfare loss.  
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et al. 2014a; 2014b; Wittwer and Griffith 2011). On the other hand, there is also evidence 622 
that current environmental water recovery is insufficient, given significant social welfare 623 
costs and over-allocation issues in the MDB (Grafton, 2019). Greater attention to 624 
management and institutional reform will be needed. 625 
 626 
There are a number of study limitations that need noting. First, given the existence of a 627 
rare historical water market monthly dataset, we modelled the most adopted (and highly 628 
liquid) water market in the MDB, the Goulburn, and hence the impact of government 629 
water recovery may differ in other less liquid water markets. Second, we cannot control 630 
for expectations within the water market (for example, irrigators knowing that the 631 
government is planning on entering the water market to buy water, or knowing that large-632 
scale irrigation infrastructure grants are going to be made available). Third, we used a 633 
cumulative measure of water recovery in the Goulburn, which is different to testing for 634 
when government is actually in the market (albeit we tried as many alternative forms as 635 
possible). The cumulative measure is not perfect, especially when estimating the extent 636 
of buyback through irrigation infrastructure grants, given the lack of detail (plus 637 
changing estimates) often provided on this by government departments. Finally, our 638 
empirical investigation uses time-series data and methods. Like other research using 639 
time-series methods (e.g., An et al. 2016), the policy impact is based upon Granger 640 
causality foundation, not the usual causality concept in economic theories. One needs to 641 
be cautious when discussing the implications. Nevertheless, our estimates provided the 642 
most advanced form of analysis so far on government water recovery in water markets, 643 
and further research would be warranted. 644 
 645 
7. Conclusion  646 
29 
 
It has been well established in the literature that irrigators have benefited considerably 647 
from the development of water markets in Australia and irrigators now use water markets 648 
regularly as a farm adaptation and risk management tool. The results of our study of the 649 
Goulburn water trade market from 1997-2017 confirmed how markets allow irrigators to 650 
respond to water scarce situations. In particular, our study was the first to explore 651 
volatility dynamics in water markets, with findings relevant for traders to better 652 
understand the uncertainty and risk in both markets. For example, in order to better cope 653 
with future market vulnerability, irrigators may need extra risk alleviation strategies such 654 
as futures markets, increased water use adaptation and relevant insurance policies. 655 
Market participants need to plan their investment in the permanent market accordingly, 656 
since risks/external shocks are persistent if they indeed have an effect on volatility in the 657 
permanent markets. Overall, our findings suggest that temporary water trade represents a 658 
highly liquid farm asset, while a permanent water trade is more similar to land ownership 659 
and is less liquid, hence is heavily influenced by previous values and hysteresis. 660 
However, permanent markets also react to the ‘rent’ that is obtained through water 661 
ownership (namely the temporary water market price), which is similar to the theory of 662 
marginal value product of farmland. Greater information and training about the 663 
opportunity costs of water markets for irrigators may be warranted. 664 
 665 
One of the most important results of this study was its finding that the federal 666 
government strategy of reverse auction tender mechanisms for water buyback from 667 
irrigators was an efficient and effective method, with little price and volume impacts 668 
detected from our Goulburn case study analysis. It is worth noting that the recent 669 
purchasing methods of the Commonwealth pursued since 2015 (namely only strategically 670 
purchasing water entitlements from large corporates and subsidising irrigation 671 
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infrastructure) warrant increased scrutiny given their marginal value of water and 672 
negative externalities. In the context of current water policy reform, this study provides 673 
valuable guidance that the impact of government buyback in MDB water markets in 674 
general has been overestimated by a number of commentators, however, issues remain 675 
regarding the increased volatility from government water recovery for irrigators engaging 676 
in temporary water markets. The increased volatility reflects a higher level of risk, which 677 
may affect the investment decisions of market participants and also agricultural 678 
production decisions. Understanding the impact on volatility is an important aspect of 679 
comprehensively measuring policy effects, especially in assessing policy impacts on 680 
water markets. At present, public focus has been on the level of price and volume 681 
supplied, but with little attention paid to the effects on risk and risk management. Our 682 
approach serves as a starting point for future risk and uncertainty research in water 683 
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Table 1 Variable Definitions and summary statistics  874 
Variable  Definition  Mean Standard 
deviation  
Minimum Maximum  
Water temporary price 
AUD/$ML  
Natural logarithm of median real monthly price for temporary water (base year 2012) 
in Goulburn (all trade price and volume data sourced from Victorian water register 
and historically from Goulburn-Murray Water) 
4.51 1.11 1.73 6.90 
Water permanent price 
AUD/$ML  
Natural logarithm of median real monthly price for high security permanent water 
(water entitlements) in Goulburn (base year 2012)  
7.25 0.40 6.40 7.94 
Water temporary volume (ML)  Natural logarithm of monthly volume traded for temporary water in Goulburn 10.11 1.12 0 12.43 
Water permanent volume (ML)  Natural logarithm of monthly volume traded for high security permanent water in 
Goulburn 
7.94 0.97 0 10.17 
Seasonal allocation level (%)  Allocation level (%) for HS permanent water in Goulburn at the beginning of each 
month (sourced from Goulburn-Murray Water) 
71 35 0 100 
Temperature  (ᵒC)  Monthly mean temperature at Kerang station for GMID (sourced from BOM) 23.72 6.45 13.6 35.3 
Feed barley price (AUD/ton)  Natural logarithm of feed barley real export price (base year 2012, sourced from 
Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics and Sciences, ABARES) 
5.53 0.23 5.07 6.14 
Skim milk dairy powder price 
(1,000 AUD/$kg)  
Natural logarithm of  skim milk powder real export price (base year 2012, sourced 
from ABARES) 
1.25 0.21 0.86 1.75 
Government policy       
Government Water Recovery 
Volume (Giga-litre, GL) 
recovered for the environment  
Natural logarithm of monthly accumulative volume of permanent water (LTAAY) 
recovered for the environment through the Commonwealth Government’s Buyback 
program and irrigation infrastructure programs in Goulburn (sources: DEWHA; 
DSEWPaC; DEW; DAWR, for various time-periods) 
2.52 2.67 0 5.83 
Notes: Summary statistics are reported based on the level variables. In the regressions, all variables use first-differences.   875 
40 
 
Table 2. Unit Root Test Results 876 










1 lag  
Phillips–Perron Test -4.053*** -1.726  -4.111*** 2.682 











Phillips–Perron Test -25.761*** -29.292*** -16.211*** -13.069*** 
Notes: P=permanent; T=temporary.  877 
Numbers in parentheses are p-values, where **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.  878 
The 1% critical value for the ADF and PP tests was -3.455. The 1% critical value for the Phillips-Perron test 879 
was 3.455. 880 
 881 
  882 
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Table 3. VARX-BEKK-GARCH Results for the Goulburn Permanent Water Market  883 
    Variable Coeff 
Std 
Error  T-Stat P-Value 
Mean Model (Permanent Volume)     
1 Permanent Volume lagged by one month -0.315 0.040 -7.856 0.000 
2 Permanent Volume lagged by two months -0.084 0.046 -1.822 0.068 
3 Permanent Price lagged by one month 0.656 0.377 1.739 0.082 
4 Permanent Price lagged by two months 0.259 0.388 0.667 0.505 
5 Temporary Price 0.329 0.145 2.265 0.023 
6 Temperature 0.015 0.010 1.510 0.131 
7 Allocation level -0.415 0.204 -2.035 0.042 
8 Feed Barley price -0.648 0.641 -1.011 0.312 
9 Skim Milk price 0.050 0.600 0.083 0.934 
10 Government Water Recovery Vol. -0.026 0.031 -0.840 0.401 
Mean Model (Permanent Price)     
11 Permanent Volume lagged by one month 0.002 0.003 0.532 0.594 
12 Permanent Volume lagged by two months 0.001 0.003 0.377 0.707 
13 Permanent Price lagged by one month -0.392 0.057 -6.896 0.000 
14 Permanent Price lagged by two months -0.123 0.051 -2.417 0.016 
15 Temporary Price 0.026 0.011 2.294 0.022 
16 Temperature -0.001 0.001 -0.745 0.456 
17 Allocation level 0.001 0.014 0.060 0.952 
18 Feed Barley price 0.020 0.052 0.380 0.704 
19 Skim Milk price -0.109 0.060 -1.823 0.068 
20 Government Water Recovery Vol -0.004 0.006 -0.777 0.437 
      
21 C(1,1) 0.554 0.140 3.973 0.000 
22 C(2,1) 0.010 0.023 0.416 0.677 
23 C(2,2) 0.027 0.018 1.509 0.131 
24 A(1,1) 0.009 0.129 0.070 0.945 
25 A(1,2) -0.009 0.010 -0.859 0.390 
26 A(2,1) 1.789 0.821 2.180 0.029 
27 A(2,2) 0.795 0.124 6.391 0.000 
28 B(1,1) 0.806 0.107 7.546 0.000 
29 B(1,2) -0.007 0.019 -0.361 0.718 
30 B(2,1) -0.402 0.526 -0.764 0.445 
31 B(2,2) 0.709 0.081 8.704 0.000 
32 D(1,1) = d11 0.003 0.060 0.043 0.966 
33 D(1,2) = d12 0.025 0.012 2.085 0.037 
34 D(2,2) = d22 -0.006 0.009 -0.690 0.490 





Table 4: VARX-BEKK-GARCH Results for the Goulburn Temporary Water Market  887 
 Variable Coeff 
Std 
Error  T-Stat 
P-
Value 
Mean Model (Temporary Volume)   
1 Temporary Volume lagged by one month -0.159 0.086 -1.854 0.064 
2 Temporary Volume lagged by two months -0.122 0.062 -1.953 0.051 
3 Temporary Price lagged by one month -0.069 0.267 -0.259 0.796 
4 Temporary Price lagged by two months -0.435 0.215 -2.018 0.044 
5 Permanent Price 0.854 0.489 1.745 0.081 
6 Temperature 0.065 0.014 4.720 0.000 
7 Allocation level 1.118 0.215 5.207 0.000 
8 Feed Barley price 0.798 0.765 1.043 0.297 
9 Skim Milk price 0.054 1.040 0.052 0.959 
10 Government Water Recovery Vol -0.136 0.082 -1.652 0.098 
Mean Model (Temporary Price)    
11 Temporary Volume lagged by one month 0.021 0.019 1.080 0.280 
12 Temporary Volume lagged by two months 0.006 0.017 0.336 0.737 
13 Temporary Price lagged by one month 0.079 0.068 1.153 0.249 
14 Temporary Price lagged by two months 0.155 0.067 2.298 0.022 
15 Permanent Price 0.334 0.193 1.727 0.084 
16 Temperature 0.008 0.005 1.439 0.150 
17 Allocation level -0.244 0.073 -3.318 0.001 
18 Feed Barley price 0.630 0.277 2.270 0.023 
19 Skim Milk price -0.186 0.278 -0.670 0.503 
20 Government Water Recovery Vol 0.000 0.009 0.021 0.983 
      
21 C(1,1) 0.584 0.193 3.023 0.003 
22 C(2,1) 0.031 0.047 0.652 0.515 
23 C(2,2) 0.264 0.018 14.365 0.000 
24 A(1,1) 0.636 0.122 5.217 0.000 
25 A(1,2) -0.037 0.045 -0.814 0.415 
26 A(2,1) 0.895 0.297 3.016 0.003 
27 A(2,2) 0.145 0.193 0.752 0.452 
28 B(1,1) 0.202 0.195 1.039 0.299 
29 B(1,2) -0.069 0.042 -1.665 0.096 
30 B(2,1) -0.781 1.704 -0.458 0.647 
31 B(2,2) 0.014 0.228 0.063 0.949 
32 D(1,1) = d11 0.178 0.099 1.797 0.072 
33 D(1,2) = d12 0.003 0.014 0.222 0.824 
34 D(2,2) = d22 -0.049 0.022 -2.198 0.028 





Figure 1. Goulburn annual water diversions and accumulative government buyback 891 
and infrastructure program water recovery volumes 892 
 893 
Sources: DEWHA, DSEWPAC, DEW; and DAWR, for various time-periods. MDBA (2018) and MDBA 894 
(various years). 895 
Figure 2. Monthly price (nominal) and volume of temporary and high security (HS) 896 
permanent water trade in the Goulburn 897 
 898 















































Figure 3. Volatility for the Goulburn permanent water market 901 
 902 
 903 
Figure 4. Volatility for the Goulburn temporary water market 904 
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Appendix A. Robustness checks for the government water recovery measurement 906 
Table A. VARX-BEKK-GARCH Results for the Goulburn Permanent Market, using 907 
Buyback water volumes only  908 
    Variable Coeff Std Error  T-Stat Signif 
Mean Model (Permanent Volume)  
1 Permanent Volume lagged by one month -0.315 0.041 -7.736 0.000 
2 Permanent Volume lagged by two months -0.084 0.045 -1.850 0.064 
3 Permanent Price lagged by one month 0.660 0.398 1.661 0.097 
4 Permanent Price lagged by two months 0.276 0.394 0.701 0.483 
5 Temporary Price 0.338 0.139 2.437 0.015 
6 Temperature 0.015 0.010 1.500 0.134 
7 Allocation level -0.425 0.201 -2.115 0.034 
8 Feed Barley price -0.672 0.648 -1.037 0.300 
9 Skim Milk price 0.033 0.604 0.055 0.956 
10 Government Water Recovery (buyback only) -0.030 0.030 -1.005 0.315 
Mean Model (Permanent Price) 
11 Permanent Volume lagged by one month 0.002 0.003 0.563 0.574 
12 Permanent Volume lagged by two months 0.001 0.003 0.387 0.698 
13 Permanent Price lagged by one month -0.388 0.063 -6.178 0.000 
14 Permanent Price lagged by two months -0.120 0.055 -2.172 0.030 
15 Temporary Price 0.026 0.011 2.404 0.016 
16 Temperature -0.001 0.001 -0.744 0.457 
17 Allocation level 0.001 0.014 0.064 0.949 
18 Feed Barley price 0.021 0.052 0.404 0.687 
19 Skim Milk price -0.109 0.062 -1.767 0.077 
20 Government Water Recovery (buyback only) -0.005 0.005 -0.875 0.382 
21 C(1,1) 0.567 0.142 3.983 0.000 
22 C(2,1) 0.014 0.020 0.690 0.490 
23 C(2,2) 0.025 0.021 1.147 0.252 
24 A(1,1) 0.026 0.130 0.204 0.839 
25 A(1,2) -0.008 0.011 -0.768 0.442 
26 A(2,1) 1.754 0.801 2.191 0.028 
27 A(2,2) 0.797 0.130 6.131 0.000 
28 B(1,1) 0.797 0.114 7.013 0.000 
29 B(1,2) -0.010 0.018 -0.546 0.585 
30 B(2,1) -0.402 0.501 -0.801 0.423 
31 B(2,2) 0.712 0.082 8.688 0.000 
32 D(1,1) = d11 -0.005 0.058 -0.091 0.928 
33 D(1,2) = d12 0.023 0.012 2.013 0.044 
34 D(2,2) = d22 -0.006 0.010 -0.600 0.548 
Note: All the variables are first-differenced.   909 
 910 
  911 
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Table B. VARX-BEKK-GARCH Results for the Goulburn Temporary Water Market, 912 
using Buyback volumes only 913 
    Variable Coeff 
Std 
Error  T-Stat Signif 
Mean Model (Temporary Volume) 
1 Temporary Volume lagged by one month -0.164 0.084 -1.969 0.049 
2 Temporary Volume lagged by two months -0.123 0.060 -2.037 0.042 
3 Temporary Price lagged by one month -0.083 0.251 -0.331 0.741 
4 Temporary Price lagged by two months -0.428 0.190 -2.254 0.024 
5 Permanent Price 0.841 0.479 1.755 0.079 
6 Temperature 0.066 0.013 4.867 0.000 
7 Allocation level 1.131 0.168 6.715 0.000 
8 Feed Barley price 0.823 0.764 1.077 0.281 
9 Skim Milk price 0.041 0.984 0.042 0.967 
10 Government Water Recovery (buyback only) -0.137 0.087 -1.565 0.118 
Mean Model (Temporary Price) 
11 Temporary Volume lagged by one month 0.020 0.017 1.125 0.261 
12 Temporary Volume lagged by two months 0.005 0.018 0.294 0.769 
13 Temporary Price lagged by one month 0.083 0.058 1.432 0.152 
14 Temporary Price lagged by two months 0.163 0.070 2.338 0.019 
15 Permanent Price 0.324 0.186 1.745 0.081 
16 Temperature 0.007 0.005 1.355 0.175 
17 Allocation level -0.245 0.070 -3.514 0.000 
18 Feed Barley price 0.635 0.270 2.348 0.019 
19 Skim Milk price -0.193 0.282 -0.686 0.493 
20 Government Water Recovery (buyback only) 0.000 0.009 0.024 0.981 
21 C(1,1) 0.598 0.145 4.129 0.000 
22 C(2,1) 0.033 0.042 0.787 0.431 
23 C(2,2) 0.264 0.017 15.195 0.000 
24 A(1,1) 0.628 0.128 4.901 0.000 
25 A(1,2) -0.033 0.043 -0.784 0.433 
26 A(2,1) 0.867 0.318 2.726 0.006 
27 A(2,2) 0.115 0.176 0.653 0.514 
28 B(1,1) 0.219 0.201 1.093 0.274 
29 B(1,2) -0.067 0.029 -2.295 0.022 
30 B(2,1) -0.667 1.589 -0.420 0.674 
31 B(2,2) 0.021 0.214 0.097 0.923 
32 D(1,1) = d11 0.178 0.095 1.862 0.063 
33 D(1,2) = d12 0.003 0.012 0.271 0.786 
34 D(2,2) = d22 -0.054 0.017 -3.123 0.002 
Note: All the variables are first-differenced.  914 
 915 
